"Whatever it is, you should clean up this city here because this city here is like an open sewer, you know? It's full of filth and scum, and sometimes I can hardly take it."1
What is it about New Yo rk City that has, in the last few years, spawned a series of books attacking the criminal justice system and describing a community in which victims' needs are compelling while the rights of the accused are an impediment to justice? Why does this apocalyptic vision of the system persist, despite statistics demonstrating the sharpest decline in the city's and the nation's crime rates in decades?2 What explains the acute detachment from the accused that is at the core of this series of books?
In Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America, Richard Uviller3 adds his voice to those of his fellow New Yorkers, including Professor George Fletcher and Judge Harold Rothwax, who have recently advocated reforms of the criminal system.4 Among the reforms they advocate are sharp constrictions of the ex clusionary rule, the right to counsel, the privilege against self incrimination, the peremptory challenge, and the admissibility of * Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B. 1983, J.D. 1986, Harvard. -Ed. Thanks to my loving family: Dave, Emma, and Sophia.
1. TAXI DRIVER (Bill Phillips Production 1976) (quoting the character Tr avis Bickle speaking to presidential candidate Charles Palatine).
2. Violent crime in New Yo rk City fell 34% in the period from 1990 through 1995, com pared with a national drop of just 6.5%. See W illi am Glaberson, Safety and Numbers: A Sp ecial Report: Crime in Region Is Dropping, but Some Po ckets Defy Tr end, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
The decline in New Yo rk City's murder -rate has far exceeded that in the nation as a whole: the City experienced 972 homicides in 1996, fewer than half of those in 1990. See Michael Cooper, Steep Drop in Random Killings Signals Shift in New Yo rk Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at A25.
3. H. Richard Uviller is Arthur Levitt Professor of Law at Columbia University School of Law.
4. See GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SoME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995); HAROLD J. ROTIIWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1995) . Professor Fletcher teaches at Columbia University Law School. Harold J. Rothwax, who died in October 1997, was a judge of the New York State Supreme Court as well as a lecturer at Columbia University Law School.
[Vo l. 96:1435 expert testimony.5 Although ostensibly examining these same is sues with the balance of a scholar rather than the voice of an advo cate, Uviller's wish list is remarkably congruent with those of the more contentious Fletcher and Rothwax. And like the work of Fletcher and Rothwax, the premise of Uviller's analysis is flawed: the procedural protections he critiques simply have not effected dramatic changes in the investigation and prosecution of crime and the sentencing of defendants.
Criminal justice in New York City is, like the city itself, hardly a national prototype. In terms of volume alone, the system is pecu liarly burdened.6 In addition, New York presents combined demographics of race7 and class,8 of access to education,9 housing,1 0 employment,11 and of the availability of weapons12 and drugs that 5. See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 28-33, 229-36, 254-55 (use of expert testimony); id. at 250-51 {peremptory challenges); RoTHWAX, supra note 4, at 35-65 (exclusionary rule); id. at 88-106 (right to counsel); id. at 66-87, 186-97 {privilege against self-incrimination).
6. Of the 1,864,000 violent crimes reported nationally in 1994, 497,960 occurred in the nation's cities. Of this number, 136,522 -28% of all urban violent crimes -were commit ted in New Yo rk City. Breaking this statistic down by crime, New Yo rk City was the scene of 72,540 (11 %) of the nation's 659,870 robberies, 2666 (2.5%) of the nation's 106,014 forcible rapes, 1,561 (6%) of the nation's 24,526 murders, and 59,755 (5%) of the nation's 1,135,000 aggravated assaults. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, CRIME IN TiiE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR TiiE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 60, 138, 238 (1995 voting disproportionate attention to the extremes,19 but also by conveying the sense that few criminals are caught and fewer still are convicted or punished.20 Of course, none of these impressions is accurate. The vast majority of crimes and offenders are ordinary, the same as one would find elsewhere in the country, although more numerous. Furthermore, New York City crime rates have dipped dramatically in recent years, demonstrating unambiguously that New Yo rk is a safer place now than it has been in a long time.21 Yet the mythology of crime in New York seems to transcend the truth. Consequently, a bunker mentality persists among longtime denizens of the city, who cling to a grim image of their own commu nity that they could, if they would, relinquish.
With fear of crime -rather than facts about crime -dominat ing the debate, the legislative landscape is littered with minimum mandatory sentencing provisions,22 "three strikes" statutes,23 modi fications of the juvenile justice system to allow youthful offenders to be tried as adults and sentenced to adult correctional facilities,24 reintroduction of the death penalty or broadening of its reach,25 and crusades to diminish the quality of inmate life.26 Recordcrime on the three major network television news shows tripled from 571 stories in 1991 to 1,632 stories in 1993 -despite the fact that crime declined slightly over that period" (citing 1993 -Th e Ye ar in Review, MEDIA MONITOR Jan.-Feb. 1994)).
19. See generally PHILIP SCHLESINGER & HowARD TUMBER, REPORTING CRIME: THE MEDIA PoLmcs OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 184 (1994) (quoting DoRis GRABER, CRIME Nsws AND THE Puauc 39 (1980) ("[An] exaggerated picture is presented of the incidence of the most violent kinds of crime, while the incidence of lesser crimes is minimized[.]"); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 18, at 71 ("Newspapers also tend to present a distorted view by focusing most of their attention on sensational crimes rather than the vastly more numerous nonviolent offenses.").
20. The proliferation of "real life" entertainment television programs like America's Most Wa nted and Unsolved Mysteries, as well as the emphasis on unsolved violent crimes in televi sion magazine programs like 60 Minutes, 20120, and Hard Copy fu els this misperception. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 18, at 70 (noting that one scholar has coined the term "mean world" syndrome "to describe how heavy viewers of television violence increasingly feel that their own lives are under siege."), citing George Gerbner, 29. In a defining anecdote, Ju dge Rothwax tells of a conversation he had with his mother early in his career as a lawyer:
When I was a fresh, young defense attorney, one of my first cases was a man who was charged with robbery. I took my job as his advocate very seriously. During that period, I was visiting my mother and I proudly told her, "I'm representing a man accused of robbery." She frowned. "What did he do?" "He's charged with robbing an old man coming home from a store," I told her. She looked at me with horror, and I could see the pride in her son the lawyer quickly slipping away. "How can you represent a man like that?" I explained patiently. "Well, Mom, he tells me he's not guilty." My mother gazed at me pityingly, as though I was the most naive creature on earth, and said with a sigh, "Son, if he can rob, he can lie." I often think of my mother's words on that day. They serve as my reminder, a tickler to my conscience. Even the most sacred idea is open to scrutiny. And even as we search for truth, we all too often give credence to a lie. RoTiiW AX, supra note 4, at 34.
30. Judge Rothwax argues, "There are many places we can look for a cure to the out-of control adversary system. But perhaps the best place to start is with a serious reevaluation of the role of the defense attorney." Id. at 139. His premise is that "[s]adly, the culture that the defense lawyer inhabits today is one that says it's okay to push the envelope, to brush against the ethical barrier and occasionally slip over." Id. at 130. In one of his less vitriolic passages, Judge Rothwax observes that:
Given the probability that the defendant is guilty, the defense attorney knows that the defendant will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the truth from being disclosed -or, failing that, misleading the jury once it is disclosed. So, when the de fendant is guilty, the defense attorney's role is to prevent, distort, and mislead. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 135 (claiming that defendants, most of whom are guilty, are "yearning neither for an accurate reconstruction of the facts nor for an error free trial").
[Vo l. 96:1435 the popular press,31 it was dismissed by legal scholars and jurists as "lopsided,"32 and a "jeremiad."33
With Virtual Justice, Uvill er takes Judge Rothwax's populist theme into the academic setting, couching in disarmingly bland prose the same radical thesis: that many of the rules of criminal procedure that have evolved through the last thirty years of consti tutional adjudication hamper law enforcement excessively and should be curtailed or repealed. Despite the fact that Uviller has buffed up Judge Rothwax's a, rguments with some sane discussion and occasional nods to the counterargument, he ends up right where Rothwax started. The Collapse of Criminal Justice and The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America pander to the same fears and exploit the same distorted perceptions. The surprise is that Uviller's sugar coated version of Rothwax's tirade is much harder to swallow.
I. NYPD BLUES: A PLEA FOR MORE POLICE DISCRETION
Uviller's major point is that the Supreme Court's readings of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are not justified. According to Uviller, "the continuous struggle between effective illegality and the blunter but prouder tactics of lawful law enforcement" (p. 109) has been wrongly resolved:
Though the Constitution was certainly drafted with the common-law model in mind, the fundamental catalogue of rights and obligations that found their way into the text do not require the full adversary mode that we have engrafted onto it. The citizen can be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures with far greater scope for court-sanctioned investigations. Our ingrained notions of the limits of interrogation and the consequences of silence are not dictated by the words of the Fi fth Amendment that none shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. And certainly the right to the assistance of counsel in one's defense does not necessitate the adversary circus or the lawyerly shield against the fair acquisition of evidence against the accused defendant. [pp. To prove his point, Uviller examines the criminal process in the conventional arrest-to-trial sequence, using a "modest collection of tales" that are fictional but, he says, not "altogether fictitious" (p. xv) to depict "common and perplexing events in the collection of evidence and the trial of criminal cases" (p. xv). He then applies his long experience as a scholar and, more surreptitiously, as a prosecu- tor, to tease out of the narratives an assortment of problems that, he contends, produce a system of "virtual," rather than true, justice.34
As a result of this choice of narrative structure, the book's tone shifts awkwardly from the Mickey Spillane diction of the "tales" to Uviller's own more ponderous analytic prose.35 Many of the fic tional passages suggest a fascination with the gadgets and jargon of police work -such as crownlights (p. 29) and bullhorns (p. 243), "perps" (p. 58), "mopes," and "The Job"36 -that is especially dis cordant with the tone of mastery that dominates the remainder of the book. While Uvill er plainly strives for diversity among his fic tional characters, with male and female police officers, prosecutors, and judges, he often slips into hackneyed stereotypes of gender and 34. While acknowledging the "congruence" between the "virtual justice" produced by the system and the "true justice" for which the system strives, Uviller notes:
But I also know that there are elements in the process -systemic flaws -that tend to bend virtual justice without distorting its apparent correspondence to true justice. In places, law fails the needs of the investigators, of the lawyers, of the fact finders; at . critical junctures action is improvised and adversary confrontations cast the players in roles that do not enhance the reliability of the synthesis. It is these aspects of the pro cess on which I will focus. Here, perhaps, we may see whether the virtual justice gener ated by the adversary system has an acceptably close correspondence to the true justice that our collective libido demands.
P. xiv.
Uviller's conception of justice as a response to libidinous demands perhaps explains the irrationality of many of his criticisms as well as his proposed solutions. Detective Bailey reaches over, slips the photo out of the book, and reads the infor mation on the back. So far so good, she thinks. At least it doesn't rule him out. Not like the victim we had in here last week who described a perp as six-four, maybe five, then ID'd a shot of a mope five-eight. Or the vie last month who made a positive on a heavy hitter who was doing four-to-eight at the time the crime went down. P. 41. In addition, like Spillane's, Uviller's fictional passages often rely upon cliche, like "the unfinished donut," p. 15, and extremely mannered diction, like "Lauren hijacked Mike's cup, took a sip of bad coffee, cold now," p. 101.
These narratives contrast abruptly with Uviller's own authoritative, and at times even patronizing, voice:
In the pages ahead, I shall conduct a short tour of this bedeviled edifice. . . . Perhaps an odd, habitual turn of the legal mind will be amusing, perhaps an unsuspected doctri nal wrinkle will raise a casual eyebrow. Harmless sport. Disappointing, perhaps, to some who seek more aggressive co=entary. But it is my prime purpose merely to engage, to reveal, and to share some of the wonder I feel as I wander through these familiar premises.
Pp. xiv-xv.
36. P. 42. This fascination perhaps has its roots in Uviller's sabbatical experiences "rid ing" with a division of the NYPD, and documented in a previous book. See H ethnicity.37 All of this makes it somewhat difficult to take the seri ous stuff seriously.
Although it appears from the opening chapter, "Overview of the Criminal Ju stice System," that Virtual Justice is written for an audi ence of readers who have not received a legal education, much of the detail would seem to hold little interest for anyone but law yers. 38 Conversely, however, the book is too simplistic for most lawyers.39 Consequently, it occupies an intermediate zone in which it is both too sophisticated for some and too superficial for others.
In addition, many of the problems to which Uviller applies his two narrative voices are so esoteric that they merit neither the overly stylized "tales"40 he develops in order to frame them nor the lengthy exegeses he then supplies. For example, Uviller's first issue -the difficulty police face when seeking a warrant to search a murder scene if the premises on which the body is found are not those of the victim -can hardly be said to have a significant im pact on the "prosecution of crime in America," as his title promises. He describes the issue as a "genuine legal hole" (p. 24) formed by the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment's warrants clause41 and the impossibility, in his view, of knowing in advance of 37. In one "tale," he writes that "Katherine was swept off her feet by Manuel's legendary Latin ardor." P. 200. In another, he presents a gay character, Bruce, whose "earliest mem· ory was the time his father had discovered a doll that Bruce had found in the attic and liked secretly to dress up and play with in his room." Pp. 271-72. Uviller appears to attribute Bruce's sexual orientation to this episode, in which his father "murder[s]" the "baby," "vi ciously slamming its sweet bewigged head against the wall until it br[eaks]." P. 272. Later in the narrative, Bruce's longing for his father's approval drives him to join the Marines. P. 272.
38. For example, in chapter 11, Uviller strives at length to explain the nuances of rules relating to admissibility of character and conduct evidence, and the risk that exceptions Ian· guage might swallow the rule against propensity evidence.
39. See, e.g., p. 261 {"In recent years, urged by the women's movement, psychologists have studied cases of women who eventually strike back after being viciously abused by their partners over an extended period. From these clinical studies, they have crafted what is now called the 'battered-spouse syndrome."'). In addition, as this example illustrates, Uviller often presents well-settled concepts as recent developments.
40. Uviller emphatically denies that these tales are "artificial -the sort of hypothetical puzzles that generations of law students have grappled with in classrooms, never to encoun ter again." P. xv. Despite this disclaimer, I think he would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that many of the tales are, as he insists, "true to life." P. xv. The Arab-American police officer working undercover to infiltrate the "Islamic Friendship Federation," who, the district attorney fears, "may be going over," p. 161, is one such unlikely tale.
41. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV ("[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, sup ported by Oath or affirm ation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
Uviller attributes this "legal hole" to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which it declined to recognize an exception to the warrant requirement for crime scene searches. Although Uviller explicates the decision in Mincey, he does so without noting that the 1978 decision was unanimous on this point, and that it refuted Uviller's position regarding crime-scene searches and, more generally, the needs of law en forcement, by restating the follO\ving fundamental principle:
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. This somewhat arcane problem becomes the vehicle for Uviller to advocate a radical expansion of police power. He proposes stat utory authorization for judges to issue warrants to search "the scene of a recent crime of a certain level of gravity -perhaps named crimes like homicide, rape, arson, kidnapping" and to allow for the seizure of evidence "notwithstanding the inability of the police to particularly describe in advance the evidence they are looking for or to give any specific reason to think they will find it" (pp. 24-25). This proposal sounds very much like a general warrant,43 a practice that Uviller concedes was "a primary abuse by the colonial police -one of the precipitating causes of the revolution, some say."44 Ye t, as throughout Virtual Justice, Uviller urges this result-oriented always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fo urth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforce ment of the criminal law.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted). Certainly, one might critique the position implicit in Mincey that no search or seizure may take place except pursuant to a warrant as lacking historical or textual support, see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI NAL PROCEDURE: FmST PRINCIPLES 4 (1997) (characterizing the Mincey rule as a "per se" approach to the Fourth Amendment that is plainly contradicted by a variety of historical sources), but Uviller does not bother to do so. Instead, he simply announces that the rule should be abrogated because it impairs law enforcement.
42. Pp. 26-27. There is nothing in Virtual Ju stice to suggest that Uviller attempted to gather such information. Moreover, Uviller offers no estimate of the frequency of the "legal hole" created when the premises to be searched are those as to whom the particularity re quirement cannot be satisfied. Jr., to general warrants -that they could be issued to a customs officer who could search all private citizens' homes or businesses without judicial oversight or accountability for the life of the warrant). Uviller suggests that his statute ought to be defensible as a vari ation on an inspection warrant,46 even while confessing the critical distinction: the inspection warrant has an administrative purpose while his crime scene warrant is all about finding evidence of a crime to be used to prosecute an individual.47 His reasoning be comes increasingly sloppy once the issue is joined; as the chapter draws to a close, he pleads, "Still, it does seem reasonable, doesn't it? And reasonability, remember, is at the heart of the Fo urth Amendment .... "4 8
As the book progresses, Uviller becomes more bold and ex pands his suggestion from the relatively infrequent context of crime scene searches to the far broader assertion that law enforcement agencies ought to be authorized to conduct door-to-door searches for firearms under this same rubric of administrative inspections. Noting only that the statute authorizing such a power "would have to be meticulously fair and even-handed" (p. 105), he pays mere lip service to the concerns that such a radical expansion of police power provokes. Acknowledging that "[a]ggressive police patrol carries an unmistakable whiff of fascism," he then brushes this con cern aside with conclusory ease: "Believing as I do, it's hard to deny that the program is compatible with basic values of our soci ety" (p. 108). Instead, Uviller unconvincingly repeats his refrain that "the key concept in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness ... a flexible idea [that] should take account of the urgency of social necessity as well as the unavailability of lesser intrusions to accom plish the purpose. "49 This sequence is repeated in succeeding chapters, as Uviller cat alogs a series of problems he sees in the criminal system, without 45. Uviller makes no effort, for example, to root the "crime scene" approach to searches ,in any source of authority, either textual or precedential. His "solution," it seems, is not so much to be applauded for its creativity as closely scrutinized for its anomaly.
46. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 47. Uviller ignores this distinction in his suggestion that Camara supports his proposal. Compare p. 26 ("My argument, I must confess, is not quite as neat as it appears. These inspection searches -along with their warrantless siblings, the 'inventory searches' ... -are frequently justifi ed by their administrative aspect, a benign purpose compared with law enforcement objectives.") with Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 {"Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for 'evidence of criminal action' which may be used to secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of 'self-protection' jointly protected by the Fourth and Ftfth Amendments are said not to be involved, but only the less intense 'right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy."' (footnote omitted)).
48. P. 26. The remainder of the sentence quotes the Amendment in full.
49. P. 105. Uviller offers no proof that a lesser intrusion -like a warrant based on probable cause -is unavailable.
attempting to substantiate them. He does not show that these problems occur with a frequency that matters, but instead charac terizes them as grave enough not only to warrant his and our atten tion, but also to justify significant changes in criminal procedure. He laments the "inescapable conundrum" (p. 50) that an equivocal photo identification from a book of mug shots -"I can't be sure. The guy who robbed me looked meaner, angrier, you know what I mean? But it could be him" (p. 41) -coupled with a second wit ness's equivocal statement that the suspect "could be one of the [people in a photo array] but I really can't say for sure" (p. 42) , does not amount to probable cause to arrest an individual and com pel him to appear in a lineup. The "problem" in this scenario, as
Uviller sees it, is that the police do not get to arrest the person that they have determined -or, more accurately, predetermined, given that there is insufficient evidence for arrest -must have commit ted the crime.
Once again, the remedy is far more dangerous than the illness: Uviller recommends adoption of a "Non-testimonial Identification" amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a solution he attributes to "[s]ome unsung hero" of "more than twenty years ago" (p. 51), whereby "probable cause" would be watered down to ''reasonable grounds" when police seek authorization to order an individual to appear in a lineup or to provide other nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints, blood, and urine (p. 51). Uviller does not even consider the potential impact of this enhanced police power on citizens, let alone offer any analysis of competing rights and interests.50 Instead, he masks the significance of the change he proposes by describing it as "[n]eat, simple, and -as far as I can see -perfectly constitutional" (p. 51).
The danger of Virtual Justice is in such glibness. Unlike Rothwax, who boldly announces his contempt for the criminal de fendant and considers it a virtue that his reform proposals will have painful costs for that constituency,51 Uviller dissembles, presenting controversial proposals as obvious boons and exploiting the tone of the scholar to disguise his bias as wisdom.
Like his colleagues Judge Rothwax and Professor Fletcher, Uviller is also highly critical of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth and Fi fth Amendment violations.52 In the Fourth Amend-50. I use the term "interests" rather than "rights" to avoid the circularity of defining the contours of the Fo urth Amendment "right" by reference to the standard of probable cause. More important, I think it is crucial to reject the subtle distortion implicit in the use of the term "rights" to describe the power exercised by law enforcement and other governmental authorities.
51. See RoTiiWAX, supra note 4, passim.
52. Pp. 69-70. Uviller, like Rothwax, advocates a rule of judicial discretion rather than the automatic remedy of the exclusionary rule. Pretending to ambivalence at first, he con-[Vol. 96:1435 ment context, he characterizes it as a "baroque minuet" (p. 80), "that ugly old monster" (p. 86), and a rule that causes us to "suffer the anomaly of lost prosecutions of guilty criminals in order to pro tect people against unreasonable invasions of security" (p. 85). Ye t again he offers almost nothing to support his contention. Certainly, much is available in legal literature as to the empirical evidence of the exclusionary rule's cost, even if that evidence's significance is debated.53 Instead, he announces in conclusory fashion that the ex clusionary rule is "the prime distortion factor in criminal verdicts, the gunk that clogs the court docket" (p. 86). Would his recommen dations about the rule differ, one wonders, if he were aware that in one four-year period, the Second Circuit did not affirm a single sup pression order?54
II. WHAT'S GOING ON: POLICE PRACTICES IN NEW y ORK CITY
IN THE 1990s Uviller's uncritical depiction of law enforcement is particularly surprising for a number of reasons. Prior to Virtual Justice, Uviller wrote Tempered Zeal, 55 an account of his experiences during a sab batical with the New Yo rk City Police Department. Tempered Zeal not only acknowledged, but also expressed concern about, the fre quency of police perjury with respect to Fourth Amendment issues such as warrants and searches. He described the "most common form of police perjury" as "the instrumental adjustment, " which he defined as "[a] slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an un wieldy constitutional constraint and obtain a just result. "56 As Uvil ler explained:
[C]ops may insert a little invention to fortify the probable cause upon which a fruitful search was predicated. Add a small but deft stroke to eludes that "on balance, I trust judges. I do not believe that the exercise of judicial discretion is a roll of the dice. And I think that the solution to the perplexing dilemma is probably in resort to good sense and an educated decision on whether exclusion is appropriate in all the complex circumstances of the particular case." P. 70 64-65 (1996) . As it happens, Uviller's recommendation -more frequent use of radio hookups between officers in the field and judges and magistrates with the authority to approve a warrant application -is hardly the "godsend" or the "beautiful deliverance," p. 85 , that he congratulates himself for proposing. Predicated as it is on another unproven con clusion -that "[t]he prime reason police do not go to court before they enter secure spaces is logistical. It's a hassle," p. 84 -Uviller's hyperbole only underscores the superficiality of the solution.
55. See Uv1LLER, supra note 36. 56. Id. at 115-16 (emphasis in original).
the facts -say, a visible bulge at the waistband of a person carrying a pistol. Just enough to put some flesh on the hunch that actually in duced the officer to give the man a toss; it might make all the differ ence. Or a police officer, understandably eager to have the jury hear the bad guy's full and free confession, might advance slightly the mo ment at which the Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the courts' insistence that they precede the very first question in a course of interrogation. That sort of thing. Although no one admitted it to me in so many words, I think most police officers regard such altera tions of events as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic post fa cto judgments that release criminals.57
Given these observations, it is surprising that Uviller never puts two and two together: reducing probable cause to reasonable cause, coupled with the frequent "invention" that "fortif[ies ]" probable cause, means a dramatic double reduction in the standard of proof for investigatory arrests -once in the word and once in the deed. What Uviller describes as a "hunch" beefed up by an "instrumental adjustment" is, under his proposal, watered down still further. At what level do we then find ourselves: bias?5S
In the eight years since Tempered Zeal, the issue of perjury among police, particularly New York City's officers, has received extraordinary scrutiny, and the evidence available to Uviller and others clearly demonstrates that the problem he not only acknowl edged, but purported to justify, has only been exacerbated. The 1994 report of the Mollen Commission, charged with investigating allegations of police misconduct in New York City, presented a dis turbing picture of police perjury that was so pervasive that the term "testilying" was coined to describe it.59 The Commission reported 57. Id. at 116. Uviller dares to defend police perjury by distinguishing between "[p]erjury that creates artificial evidence" and thereby "distorts the data being considered by the jury," on the one hand, and "lies that result in a more complete picture of the events on trial." He actually applauds this latter category of perjury as "contribut[ing] to the accuracy of the verdict" Id. at 117.
58. Most disturbing is the prospect of illegitimate factors, like race and class, assuming an even greater role in the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials than they do under present constitutional standards. Racism already forms an all-too-common basis for the 
on such practices as "turnover arrests,"60 "collars for dollars,"61 and other forms of systematic perjury. 62 The prosecutors who work with these officers demonstrated a level of knowledge that amounts to complicity: as one anonymous Manhattan A.D.A. noted, "No one looks down on it. ... Taking money is considered dirty, but perjury for the sake of an arrest is accepted. It's become more cas ual. And the civil libertarians have no effective response to it. It's almost an intractable problem." 63 During this same period in which Uviller bewailed the increased burden that current rules of criminal procedure have imposed on law enforcement, the New Yo rk City Police Department was ripped apart by a succession of scandals in precincts in the Bronx,64 Man hattan,65 Brooklyn,66 and Queens,67 involving an estimated 300 of ficers68 who used their status as police systematically to rob, beat, and harass citizens. The Mollen Commission described "well or ganized police 'crews' terrorizing minority neighborhoods" and noted that they were "more akin to street gangs: small, loyal, flexi ble, fast-moving and often hard hitting." 6 9 They engaged in a prac tice cryptically referred to as "doing doors" -"illegally raiding drug dens for plunder"70 -and routinely used "sapgloves" -lead lined gloves -and heavy flashlights to assault men, women, and teenagers that they encountered during these raids.7 1 Moreover, since the publication of Virtual Justice; New Yorkers witnessed an episode of police brutality that was as shocking for its cruelty as for its suggestion that at least some police officers believe they are free to act with complete impunity. The officer charged with shoving a wooden rod into the rectum and then the mouth of Abner Louima is alleged to have borrowed a pair of gloves from a colleague in the public lobby of the stationhouse, stripped Louima from the waist down in that public lobby, and then taken him in handcuffs to the bathroom where he committed the assault. After the attack, the officer is alleged to have led Louima to the holding cell with his pants around his ankles and to have then walked through the stationhouse hallway brandishing the stick. 72 In the pe riod following disclosure of the assault, many observers suggested that Mayor Giuliani's law enforcement policies had created that cli mate of perceived impunity.13
While Uviller did not focus his book on these extraordinary epi sodes of corruption, his anxiety that law enforcement is inade quately equipped to address the problem of crime is significantly undermined by their existence. The anxiety, it would seem, is bet ter suited to the prospect of these same officers enjoying a broader range of discretion and authority. Quite simply, it is a problem of credibility for Uviller to have omitted all reference to these contem poraneous developments. [Vol. 96:1435 Uviller also fails to address an ancillary, and perhaps more in sidious, problem that arises from police abuse: judicial tolerance of these practices. The heated public controversy surrounding the de cision of U.S. District Judge Baer to suppress evidence seized by New York City police officers from the automobile of an African American woman on a Washington Heights street demonstrates how pliant even life-tenured judges can be in the face of public and political pressure about crime.74 Judge Baer initially found, based in significant part upon the officers' lack of credibility, that the po lice lacked a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's car was in volved in criminal activity at the time of the stop.75 He subsequently reversed himself, credited the testimony of the police, and rejected that of the defendant. Supp. 232 {S.D.N.Y. 1996) {holding that defendant's "story is now less convincing" and that "with more evidence and upon review, the Government's version is more credible").
Indeed, Judge Baer did not merely reverse himself but concluded his opinion with a somewhat cloying apology and self-flagellation: "[u)nfortunately, the hyperbole {dicta) in my initial decision not only obscured the true focus of my analysis, but regretfully may have demeaned the law-abiding men and women who make Wa shington Heights their home and the vast majority of the dedicated men and women in blue who patrol the streets of our great City." 921 F. Supp. at 217. The passage stands in stark contrast to his earlier sense of being "shatter[ed)" by the lack of security of people of color in their own communities, 913 F. Supp. at 240, and his acid observation that "the same United States Attorney's Offi ce which brought this prosecution enj oyed more success in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer of an anti-crime unit operating in this very neighborhood," 913 F. Supp. at 242.
77. See, e.g., Co=onwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 1996) (reversing a trial court determination that a juvenile charged with homicide was amenable to rehabilitation and should therefore be tried in juvenile rather than adult trial court); Judy Rakowsky, Judge Dismissed from O'Brien Case, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al (reporting that supreme judicial court, exercising "power of general superintendence," removed trial judge after re versal to "eliminate controversies and unnecessary issues in further proceedings and in any appeal").
Carol Steiker has noted that even if the judicial will to address flagrant police misconduct existed, an array of procedural doctrines has either emerged or been greatly expanded that has had the effect of precluding any relief. See Carol S. Steiker, Co11nter-Revol11tion in Con stitutional Criminal Procedure? Tw o Audiences, 1ivo Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468-that reduced standards for police intervention might have when conjoined with an increasingly superficial judicial review of police conduct.
III. EMPATHY AND CONTEMPT: THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
Using similarly specious arguments to advocate radical reforms, Uviller shows disgust and frustration with a number of other well established rules of criminal procedure, such as the right to coun sel78 and the right against self-incrimination.79 But he reserves his 78. Uviller's subheading for his chapter on this part of the criminal process says it all : "Dramatic, Deceitful, and Dilatory Assistance." P. 132. Here he is arm·in·arm with Judge Rothwax, see RoTIIW AX, supra note 4, at 79·82 (arguing that "interrogation and trial have disparate goals" and that "straightforward questioning in a nonhostile, nonthreatening envi ronment ... [is] the very essence of respect"), advocating a limit on the assistance of counsel that would keep counsel out of the investigatory phase of all criminal proceedings and allow them a role only at the trial itself:
As we have seen, critical stages may occur outside the courtroom -at lineup identifica tions, for example, and interviews with police or their covert agents at which some in criminating admission may be elicited. But the core of the counsel clause (the true meaning of the provision, some -like me -would argue) is the promise of profes sional assistance at the most critical stage: courtroom proceedings. Pp. 136-37; see also H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1987) (characterizing the right to counsel as "the villain of the piece" and arguing that the right to counsel has been misapplied as "an artificial device of cloture on government efforts to obtain cognitive evidence").
Uviller ignores -or purposely avoids accounting for -the basic principle of trial advo cacy holding that preparation in large part determines one's likelihood of success at trial. Assistance in the courtroom only is too little too late. But see id. at 1169 (arguing that "[m]ost" of the "critical" stages for purposes of the assistance of counsel "occur after the case has crossed the courtroom threshold, of course, but some may arise during the investigatory or preparatory stages").
In addition, Uviller does not account for the fact that the prosecution largely controls the time of indictment and hence the time that the right to counsel attaches. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to construe no-contact rule of ethics as limited to the moment of indictment, because "[t]he timing of an indictment's return lies substantially within the control of the prosecutor .... [who] could manipulate grand jury proceedings to avoid its encumbrances").
79. Pp. 123-31. Again, Uviller here is in perfect harmony with Rothwax, see RoTIIW AX, supra note 4, at 79 (criticizing Miranda's reasoning as "result [ing] in a system where we deny people the opportunity to take responsibility for their criminal acts"), arguing, as did the judge, that "[t]he social imperative that has been with us at least since people began to write about social imperatives is that, along with their taxes, citizens owe the government a duty of disclosure." P. 111. This position amounts to little more than an expression of frustration with the drafters of the Fi fth Amendment, which cannot more plainly state an abrogation of this duty in the context of criminal proceedings. Cf. RoTIIW AX, supra note 4, at 230-31 ("What would be so wrong with a system that requested a defendant to testify in a court of law, on the record, and in the presence of his lawyers and the judge, after a showing of his probable guilt had been demonstrated by the evidence?").
Uviller reveals his prosecutorial bias quite plainly at the chapter's end when, in response to the proposition that either "[a]ll but spontaneous confessions could be banned ... [o]r ... the moment of official accusation could be advanced to the point of arrest and the attached right of counsel decreed unwaivable except in the presence of counsel," he states, " [l] ooking boldly at the prospect of a law enforcement landscape stripped utterly of confession evi dence, we cannot suppress a shudder." P. 130. He prophesies that if confessions are to be [Vol. 96:1435 particular contempt for criminal defense attorneys, presumptuously imagining a typical such lawyer and her attitudes toward her work and her clients in a manner that demonstrates a profound unfamili arity with those who do this work.80 He proudly declares that he has actually dared to take the question to several acquaintances in the defense bar. "How can you do it?" I asked. "Case after case, year after year. Putting your own integrity on the line for a clientele that is, in the overwhelming proportion, guilty and ungrateful?" Most law yers do not quarrel with the premise -at least those who know me well enough to be candid. s1
, The experience of those who practice as criminal defense attor neys is far different from the cartoon that Uviller offers as incontro vertible truth. Lawyers for those charged with crimes who face the full weight of the state's power suff er not from a contempt for those they represent, but rather from an overabundance of care that is continually challenged by the many biases latent in the criminal jus tice system. It is an excess of empathy, not the detachment that Uviller supposes.s3
Charles Ogletree writes about this characteristic of the public defender's relationship to his or her clients:
My relationships with clients were rarely limited to the provision of conventional legal services. I did not draw rigid lines between my professional practice and my private life. My relationship with my . clients approximated a true friendship. I did for my clients all that I would do for a friend. I took phone calls at all hours, helped clients find jobs, and even interceded in domestic conflicts. I attended my conduct in this area make no distinction that is contingent upon the lawyer's role at trial. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1995) (prohibiting "[a] lawyer" from offering evidence "that the lawyer knows to be false").
Uviller further absolves the prosecution of responsibility for witness testimony by arguing that "if (as is sometimes the case) the prosecutor simply does not know whether the identifi cation her witness swears to is accurate ... the prosecutor is entitled to bring the facts out fairly and fully and let the jury decide. 
("[T]
he prosecutor is obliged to refuse to call witnesses believed to be false and to dis miss charges against a defendant believed to be innocent. Defense counsel is not charged with any public responsibility to the truth.") with Wade, 388 lT. S. at 256 (White, J., dissenting) ("Law enforcement officers ... must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of [a] crime .... But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth."). Why is there no comparable entitlement on the part of defense counsel to be uncertain, and to pres ent to the factfinder evidence that he or she does not "know" to be false? See 73, 78 (1996) (criticizing the "one-sidedness" of the criminal system and noting that "young [criminal defense] lawyers learn after a short while that, for many clients, there is little they can do to achieve results that seem to be objectively rational and fair. The sense of hopeless ness can become overwhelming to the point that it compromises the lawyer's dignity"); Lef court, supra note 54, at 61-62 ("Representing an innocent client is an easy situation for the public to support. In practice it is the hardest because of the overwhelming fear of loss.").
Even James S. Kunen, author of "Ho w Can Yo u Defe nd Th ose People?": The Making of a Criminal Lawyer and a harsh critic of his criminal experiences, described feelings of empa thy during his experience at the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C.:
Nor can you afford to feel a lot of sympathy for the clients .... Some of them earn the courthouse epithet "dirtball," but most of them are likable enough when you're trying to help them, and you'd have to be a moral moron not to see that they are victims, too. It's just that too much sympathy for the clients gets in the way of doing your job. Yo u have to sell them on the advantages of doing five years instead of ten. Yo u have to watch the iron doors closing behind them all the time. "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 143 (1983).
[Vol. 96:1435 clients' weddings and their funerals. When clients were sent to prison, I maintained contact with their families. Because I viewed my clients as friends, I did not merely feel justified in doing all I could for them; I felt a strong desire to do so.84
In the real world of crime victims, as opposed to the tabloid world of true crime stories and America's Most Wanted, the capacity for empathy is surprisingly strong and seems to be inversely propor tional to our distance from the obj ect.85 Not surprisingly, juries presented with the "stories" of actual people respond, as do their counsel, with empathy and compassion, not with contempt and detachment. 8 6
It is in this respect that Uviller's rhetoric begins to echo the crime rhetoric of the city from which he writes, accepting as truths things that are either distorted or in doubt, and then constructing elaborate and unnecessary remedies on their backs. The funda mental characteristic that unites Uviller and his cohorts with the police -and against existing rules of criminal procedure, criminal defendants, and their lawyers -is a want of empathy. Like Tr avis Bickle,87 they rage against a tidal wave of crime that exists in the imagination, fueled by the media and by the isolation from others that is part of modem urban life.
It seems reasonable to ask that before we embrace changes that impair fundamental rights, there should be some demonstration that the flaws are real and have costs. H, instead, the flaws are imagined or the costs, if any, are minimal, then the only justification for the reforms that Uviller advocates is the bare political prefer ence for a diff erent allocation of power between government and individual. In that case, give me Judge Rothwax, a wolf in wolf's clothing, rather than the sheepishness of Virtual Justice.
